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LEARNING FROM FRIENDS AND TERMINATING FRIENDSHIPS:
RETRIEVING FRIENDSHIP AS A MORAL EDUCATIONAL CONCEPT
Kristján Kristjánsson
Jubilee Center for Character and Virtues
University of Birmingham, UK
Abstract. In contrast to ancient times, friendship is rarely discussed nowadays as a resource in moral
education. Even within Aristotle-inspired character education, where it could naturally claim pride of
place, its coverage is miniscule compared, say, to that of the emulation of moral exemplars. The aim
of the present article is to retrieve friendship as a moral educational concept: to explain how moral
educational goals define and sustain deep friendships, and how the thorny issue of when friendships
should be terminated is best understood in terms of considerations as to whether they have exhausted
their educational potential. By arguing that education is the raison d’être of deep friendship, Kristján
Kristjánsson shows how friendship is developmentally constituted and, in its most complete form as
“character friendship,” educationally executed. There is no such thing as friendship per se, but rather
friendship at a certain developmental niveau (or level), with its specific developmental assets and
liabilities: qualitatively differentiated according to its educational affordances. While operating within
a broad Aristotelian framework, Kristjánsson devotes two sections to charting the moral educational
liabilities that may dissipate even the most complete friendships, a topic mostly overlooked by Aristotle
himself.
Key Words. friendship as an educational concept; Aristotle; character friendships; friendship
terminations; equal and unequal friendships
The ancient Greeks considered philosophy to begin with wonder. Wonder is
one of the motivations behind the present article, but the other is disillusionment
with the current academic literatures on friendship and how those relate (or, in
most cases, fail to relate) to education in general and moral education in particular.
It is almost a platitude that educational institutions provide the context within
which some of the most enduring friendships are initiated and forged, often for a
lifetime: among students or between students and teachers. Those contexts and
the friendships they engender form a recurring theme in world literature, both
“serious” (such as Brideshead Revisited) and “light” (such as the Harry Potter
series). A veritable mountain of academic literature exists on the correlations — as
causal links are more difficult to establish — between school- or university-formed
friendships and various positive psychological variables, most specifically between
friendship and (student) well-being. The potential psychological benefits are typi-
cally understood subjectively as happiness but in some cases objectively as flour-
ishing.1 Moreover, in some studies, friendship is evaluated in light of its effect on
1. See William K. Rawlins, Friendship Matters: Communication, Dialectics, and the Life Course
(London: Aldine, 2008), for a helpful overview of twentieth-century sources. For more recent references,
see Blaine J. Fowers and Austen R. Anderson, “Aristotelian Philia, Contemporary Friendship, and Some
Resources for Studying Close Relationships,” in The Theory and Practice of Virtue Education, ed. Tom
Harrison and David Ian Walker (London: Routledge, 2018), 184–196; and Austen R. Anderson and Blaine
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educational outcomes, for example, grade attainment. However, only in rare cases
is friendship explored in light of its intrinsic educational value, be it intellectual
(say, the role friendship plays in one’s self-constitution as a reflective being) or
moral (say, how friendship may be seen as constitutive of moral growth). While
exceptions do exist,2 those are few and far between.
The only serious exception to this rule was provided by the adult-education
movement with its heyday in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Forming societies that were meant to educate (aka “self-improve”) working adults
through engaged interactions in friendship-grounded activities, the movement was
so successful that by 1880, 75 to 80 percent of British working-class men belonged
to such societies.3 While many undoubtedly engaged in these societies for less
high-brow reasons than virtue cultivation, the leaders of the movement had a clear
conception of the edifying role of friendship and its transformative potential as an
apprenticeship in intellectual, civic, and moral virtue.
The few contemporary sources that relate friendship to what could be called
“moral development” or “moral education,” broadly conceived (such as the papers
by Mary Healy cited in note 2), are usually written from perspectives that stand
apart from the major paradigms in moral psychology or education, such as Kohlber-
gianism, neo-Kohlbergianism, social and emotional learning, or positive psychol-
ogy/education. Friendship is, for example, surprisingly not one of the twenty-four
character strengths identified in the widely used classificatory schema developed
by the Values in Action (VIA) Institute — although love is.4 Less surprising is
the lack of moral educational uptake in the mainstream psychological friendship
literature. This literature remains mired in a social scientific genre that overall
renounces the normative and embraces the descriptive, and one that has scant
J. Fowers, “An Exploratory Study of Friendship Characteristics and Their Relations with Hedonic and
Eudaimonic Well-Being,” Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 37, no. 1 (2020): 260–280.
2. See, in particular, some recent penetrating studies by Mary Healy: Mary Healy, “‘We Are Not Friends
Anymore’: Self-Knowledge and Friendship Endings,” Ethics and Education 10, no. 2 (2015): 186–197; and
Mary Healy, “After Friendship,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 51, no. 1 (2017): 161–176. See also
older studies, such as Patricia White, “Friendship and Education,” Journal of Philosophy of Education
24, no. 1 (1990): 81–91; William M. Bukowski and Lorrie K. Sippola, “Friendship and Morality: (How) Are
They Related?,” in The Company They Keep: Friendship in Childhood and Adolescence, ed. William M.
Bukowski, Andrew F. Newcomb, and Willard W. Hartup (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
238–261; and Marilyn Friedman, What Are Friends for? Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships
and Moral Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), chap. 7.
3. Michele E. Doyle and Mark K. Smith, “Friendship and Informal Education,” The Encyclopedia of
Informal Education, 2002, http://infed.org/mobi/friendship-and-education/.
4. Christopher Peterson and Martin E. P. Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and
Classification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
KRISTJÁN KRISTJÁNSSON is Professor in the School of Education and Deputy Director of the Jubilee
Centre for Character and Values at the University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT,
UK; e-mail <k.kristjansson@bham.ac.uk>. His primary areas of scholarship are moral philosophy, moral
education, and moral psychology.
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understanding of the notion of intrinsic (as opposed to extrinsic or even just
instrumental) value. The standard ploy in friendship research in psychology is
to offer some generic characterization of friendship, such as that friendship is “a
reciprocal relationship where there is mutual liking and enjoyment spent in each
other’s company.”5 People’s own specifications of their deep or best friendships,
then, tend to be taken at face value and the question becomes not what does —
let alone should ideally — ground them morally, but rather what “provisions”
such friendships between self-described kindred spirits offer (for example, com-
panionship, help, intimacy, reliable assistance, self-validation, emotional security)
and how those provisions are correlated with significant psycho-social variables,
most notably either subjective well-being or a positive self-concept (understood
as socially constructed “identity” rather than morally grounded character6). The
standard methodological approach to friendship research in psychology is therefore
characterized by a unidimensional, instrumentalist, and amoral understanding of
friendship, where friendship will vary quantitatively with respect to a number of
variables but is not taken to assume normatively different types.
Contrast this tradition with the classical Greek conception of friendship as
“a categorical repository for the hope of a mutually edifying moral covenant
voluntarily negotiated between people”7 and the difference could hardly be starker.
The Greeks in general, and Aristotle in particular, were well-nigh obsessed with
the moral and educational value of friendship. Two of the ten books of the
Nicomachean Ethics and nearly a third of the Eudemian Ethics are devoted to
friendship: its recognizably ethical nature, its educational ramifications, and the
proper or improper reasons for its termination. Friendship, in its ideal instantiation,
is seen there, along with the other virtues, as nothing less than the “perfection of
man’s [sic] potential as a rational being.”8
This fact illuminates an even more surprising aspect of the friendship lacuna
in current accounts of moral education: namely, its absence in most of the recent
character-education literature. Typically understood as the practical application of
virtue ethics, which in turn is largely driven by Aristotelian or quasi-Aristotelian
considerations,9 contemporary character educators are in tireless pursuit of ways
in which to apply Aristotelian conceptualizations to, and to craft Aristotle-based
interventions for, school practices, including, to name just a few examples, by
using habituation (via service learning), stories and music, or role modeling. A large
5. Karen Majors, “Friendship: The Power of Positive Alliance,” in Positive Relationships:
Evidence-Based Practice across the World, ed. Sue Roffey (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer,
2012), 127–144.
6. See, for example, François Poulin and Alessandra Chan, “Friendship Stability and Change in Childhood
and Adolescence,” Developmental Review 30, no. 3 (2010): 257–372.
7. Rawlins, Friendship Matters, 13 (emphasis added).
8. Lorraine Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 196.
9. Kristján Kristjánsson, Aristotelian Character Education (London: Routledge, 2015).
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discourse already exists on the last-mentioned strategy, also known (in Aristotelian
language) as the emulation of moral exemplars.10 Notably, however, Aristotle
himself devotes much more space to friendship as a source of character education
than to the emulation of glorified exemplars. Why does no one seem to pick up
that fact and run with it? The only sustained discussion of this issue that I have
come across is in an article by Diana Hoyos-Valdés,11 who asks in exasperation why
Aristotelian character educators prioritize role-modeling so much over friendships.
However, tellingly, that article was published neither in an education journal nor
in a pure philosophy one. Mainstream philosophers have written insightful papers
on Aristotelian friendship, even foregrounding its educational element,12 but those
papers tend to be written with exegetical or moral theoretical aims in mind rather
than as contributions to an essentially educational discourse.
To cut a long story short, the aim of the present article is to retrieve friendship
as a moral educational concept: to explain how moral educational goals ground
and sustain deep friendships, and how the thorny issue of when friendships
should be terminated is best understood in terms of considerations regarding
when friendships have exhausted their educational potential. By arguing that
education is the raison d’être of deep friendship, I want to show how friendship is
developmentally constituted and, in its most complete form at least, educationally
oriented. While Aristotle idealized the most complete type of friendship overly
and overlooked various potential reasons for friendship terminations,13 I still
consider a broadly Aristotelian framework best suited to the task of carrying out
the current aim.
There are three main reasons for using Aristotle’s account of friendship to
anchor this analysis. Historically, Aristotle’s discussion has served as an unsur-
passable source of inspiration. Even those friendship theorists who ultimately
reject Aristotle’s moralized view of friendship — in favor of an aestheticized view,
for instance14 — still tend to use Aristotle as the springboard of their argumenta-
tion. Logically, I am in broad if uneasy agreement with Aristotle’s taxonomy of
friendships and consider it to further the aim of teasing out the educational nature
of friendship. Finally, expositorily, the stringent conditions that Aristotle places
10. See, for example, the following 2019 special issue of the Journal of Moral Education: Angelo Cam-
podonico, Michel Croce, and Maria Silvia Vaccarezza, “Moral Exemplarism and Character Education:
Guest Editors’ Preface,” Journal of Moral Education 48, no. 3 (2019): 275–279.
11. Diana Hoyos-Valdés, “The Notion of Character Friendship and the Cultivation of Virtue,” Journal
for the Theory of Social Behaviour 48, no. 1 (2018): 66–82.
12. See, for example, John M. Cooper, “Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship,” Review of Metaphysics 30,
no. 4 (1977): 619–648; and Talbot Brewer, “Virtues We Can Share: Friendship and Aristotelian Ethical
Theory,” Ethics 115, no. 4 (2005): 721–758.
13. Kristján Kristjánsson, “Ten Un-Aristotelian Reasons for the Instability of Aristotelian Character
Friendships,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 49, no. 1 (2019): 40–58.
14. For example, Elizabeth Telfer, “Friendship,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71, no. 1 (1971):
223–241; and Alexander Nehamas, On Friendship (New York: Basic Books, 2016).
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upon the most complete type of friendship help develop my argument, for if I can
show that even friendships so parsimoniously construed are liable to perversions
that may reasonably lead to their dissolution, it will be more plausible to suppose
that the more permissive types may also, and more easily, suffer the same fate.
The aim invoked above calls potentially for two distinct articles. One would
set out the positive developmental conditions for becoming friends (by practicing
friendship), how this process unfolds educationally, and how it can be stimulated
in moral educational contexts through various classroom strategies. This article
would also need to distinguish between the respective pros and cons of Aristotelian
role-modeling and Aristotelian friendship. The second article, on the other hand,
would need to explore the negative side of the story: how viewing friendship as an
educational concept helps make sense of some of the shortcomings of friendship
— specifically, cases in which it cannot hit its golden mean as a virtue and is liable
to rupture. I have decided to begin here with the second proposed article, because
focusing on liabilities first and getting those out of the way is often a good way of
identifying assets. My analysis proceeds as follows: In the next section, I set out
various moral and educational considerations relating to friendships, especially of
the Aristotelian kind, and then, in the two sections that follow that discussion,
I explore moral educational liabilities of associations between friends of equal
and unequal social standing, respectively. In closing, the final section offers some
concluding thoughts.
Readers should be forewarned that this article is very much exploratory. As a
means of rehabilitating friendship qua moral educational concept, the best way
to proceed is to conduct an exercise in talking about friendship in educational
terms and see where that leads us, rather than taking for granted from the outset
that friendship is unquestionably an educational resource, ripe for curricular
application. This article serves the purpose of such an initial exercise.
Background: From Aristotle to Contemporary Social Science
In order to set the context of the argumentation, I apply a fairly wide lens in this
section and present a brisk overview of Aristotelian theory. I also need, however,
to stick my head above the Aristotelian parapet and consider some recent social
scientific findings. Given Aristotle’s own naturalistic methodology, according to
which all moral theorizing is answerable to facts about what makes human beings
flourish or wilt, deferential Aristotelianism — overlooking fresh empirical findings
— counts ex hypothesi as misbegotten Aristotelianism.
Friendship for Aristotle is conscious “reciprocated goodwill.”15 It assumes
three main types, where the first two (friendships for pleasure and utility) are
“incomplete” — because of their essentially extrinsically valuable and transitory
natures — but the most developed type (character friendships) is “complete”
because of its unique intrinsic and enduring nature (NE, 211ff [1156a6ff]). Notably,
15. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), 210 [1155b32–5].
This work will be cited in the text as NE for all subsequent references.
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pleasure and utility friendships have clear uses and are necessary for smooth
human association, and they will continue even among those who have formed
character friendships. While not entirely consistent on this point, Aristotle makes
it a necessary conceptual condition of all the three (genuine) types of friendship
that to be a friend to someone “you must wish [the person] good for his own
sake” (NE, 210 [1155b31–32]). Nevertheless, once the raison d’être of the two
incomplete types (of being mutually advantageous or mutually pleasurable) is
lost, they dissolve fairly easily (in contrast with character friendships) despite the
intrinsic goodwill that sustains them while they last.
That said, it would be easy to reconstruct Aristotelian theory about at least
some instances of utility friendships as having significant moral educational
value. However, Aristotle himself did not have the broad contemporary concept of
“moral” at his disposal, so when he speaks of the educational value of friendship,
it is always in the service of the “ethical”: referring (in ancient Greek) to the
cultivation of virtue-grounded character. As only a privileged group of people,
“brought up in good habits” (NE, 6 [1095b4–5]) and already (being) conditioned
into virtue from an early age, stand a reasonable chance of developing virtue-based
character, Aristotle’s references to what we would nowadays categorize as the
moral educational value of friendship are limited to this narrowly defined group. I
have explained above why it serves the purpose of this article to be parsimonious
in exploring the thesis about moral education as the raison d’être of friendship, so
I will resist the urge to “correct” Aristotle here.
Apart from the features they share with the incomplete types, character
friendships have some features that are unique to them. For example, they involve
(a) spending time together in shared activities, (b) sharing joys and sorrows, (c)
loving the friend for her own sake in the form of loving her character (as her set of
virtues), (d) “soulmateship” in the strong sense of being related to friends as they
are to themselves, “since the friend is another himself [sic]” (NE, 246 [1166a30–33];
see also 260 [1170b6–7] and 265 [1172a32–34]), and (e) viewing the friendship as
intrinsically valuable to the extent of seeing the friend as irreplaceable, not only
painfully replaceable as in some developed forms of utility friendships.
When Aristotle elaborates upon those features as the defining criteria of char-
acter friendships, some of his discussion smacks of idealizations — and similar
idealizations mar his account of when character friendships are or should be ter-
minated, as we see presently. Take, for instance, the stringent conditions that
Aristotle places upon character friends’ willingness to expose themselves (includ-
ing their foibles and weaknesses) to one another and their ability to do this through
accurate self-knowledge; or the romanticized view of the unproblematic concord
between friends as having “one spirit.”16 John Cooper explains the penchant for
idealization as part of a teleological bias in Aristotle’s thinking that induces him
16. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On Virtues and Vices, trans. Harris
Rackham (London: William Heinemann, 1935), 403 [1240b1–5].
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to define things with respect to their most fully realized instances.17 So despite his
thinly veiled digs at the cardboard idealist Plato and the latter’s vantage point of
secure distance from real life, Aristotle cannot always avoid falling into the same
trap. Lorraine Pangle, on the other hand, sees Aristotle’s idealizations as a pedagog-
ical ploy that aims to avoid breeding any whiff of cynicism among his readers as
young budding phronimoi.18 Whatever the reason, Aristotle ends up underplaying
the fiery impulsiveness and precarious happenstance that characterize all friend-
ships, even of the most complete type. Incidentally, many popular (literary and
other) accounts of what people nowadays would simply refer to as “deep” or “best”
friendship share this aura of romantic invincibility, so for those readers without a
full command of the Aristotelian concept of “character friendship,” it will suffice
in what follows to think of the contemporary concepts of “deep friendship” or
“soulmateship” instead.
One thing to note before proceeding further is that not only does Aristotle
fail to bow to the prohibition on value judgments imposed by many current social
scientists, the Humean bifurcation of facts and values is entirely foreign to him.
He does not understand evaluative language as evaluating an independent world
of description, but rather as describing a world of evaluation, which is as “real” as
— and indeed inseparably mingled with — the factual world. This explains why
he chooses to take the verdicts of the many and the wise as starting points about
what we would call “value judgments,” in just the same way as he does in the case
of other “factual judgments.” Those initial verdicts may well need to be rejected
if good reasons appear to support their nonvalidity. However, prevailing views can
never be fully consigned into inconsequence. We must engage with them, and the
onus is on us to show that they are wrong. So to establish, for example, as Aristotle
wants to do, the educational nature of character friendship, there is no need to elicit
a logical connection, or even an empirical one, between the concepts in question,
based on large samples; it suffices to enlist the views of the many and the wise and
then fail to come up with plausible evidence to disconfirm them. Analogously,
the question of when friendships are terminated (by wise people) and when they
should be terminated is basically the same question for Aristotle.
So what is character friendship really for according to Aristotle?
Although that question allows for a number of possible answers — and the
sharing-joys-and-sorrows condition shows him, for example, not to be averse to
contemporary concerns with the effects of friendship on mental well-being —
the core answer seems to be that moral education constitutes its raison d’être.
Character friends become “better from their activities and their mutual correc-
tion” as “each moulds the other,” and through this mutual molding they become
“more capable of understanding and acting” (NE, 266 [1172a11–14] and 208
[1155a15–16]). Friendship of this kind educates by being knowledge-enhancing,
virtue-enhancing, and life-enhancing in general terms, because the friends act as
17. Cooper, “Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship,” 629.
18. Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship, 131.
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each other’s procreators on the trajectory toward full phronesis.19 The dynamics
of how exactly this happens, and how it can be made to happen more effectively
through educational interventions, is a topic for another paper, as already noted.
In the remainder of this article, I will focus on the potential perils that the edu-
cational nature of character friendship poses. To do so, however, I need to say
something about what we could call, to paraphrase Lev Vygotsky, the zone of
proximal development of character friendships: the zone in which moral (charac-
ter) education can take place through scaffolding by the friend — in between the
two zones where I can, and cannot, cultivate my character on my own.
Simply put, the zone in question comprises people brought up with guidance
in good habits who are neither too good nor too bad. A human does not befriend
a god, although the god could figure as a role model; similarly, two phronimoi
(perfectly virtuous people) do not engage in what we would normally consider to
be moral education, although it could be considered “education” of a kind. At this
extreme top end of the zone in question, then, the friendship relation involves
an evolving bond within which “friends draw each other out and participate in
the fine-toothed articulation of each other’s character.” They affirm each other’s
evaluative outlooks “unreservedly and unconditionally” and engage in a “running
appreciation” of their “jointly produced sensibilities.”20 The idea here is that just
as the phronimoi no longer need emulousness as a virtue (because they have
nothing left to learn from role models), they no longer need to learn from each
other either, but can simply relish each other’s virtuousness and affirm it. One
could argue that Aristotle is here, once again, trading in undue idealizations and
that he should have been more mindful of his own examples of how even the
highly virtuous can go wrong.21 So, on a plausible Aristotelian account (although
not Aristotle’s own), the phronimoi would still need lifelong moral education in
the ordinary sense (see, for example, Talbot Brewer who talks about Aristotelian
character friendships as “lifelong sources of … ethical education”22). However,
even if we take Aristotle’s own description of friendship between fully fledged
phronimoi at face value, it does not subvert the thesis that moral education is
the raison d’être of character friendship, for the phronimoi would not have got
to where they are without having traversed the relevant moral developmental
trajectory with the help of character friends. At the present time, they are simply
enjoying the fruits of their hard work and exercising their virtues in the company of
friends, making sure they do not lie fallow, much in the same way that some people
might go to the gym with mates to stay at their ideal fitness level, without the
motivation or need to improve. To be sure, this is a slightly unusual understanding
of “education,” but it is not a counterexample to the main thesis of this article.
19. Telfer, “Friendship,” 239–240.
20. Brewer, “Virtues We Can Share,” 726, 730, and 758.
21. Howard J. Curzer, “How Good People Do Bad Things: Aristotle on the Misdeeds of the Virtuous,”
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28, no. 1 (2005): 233–256.
22. Brewer, “Virtues We Can Share,” 726.
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More relevant for present purposes are, however, three cohorts of people —
all budding rather than fully developed phronimoi — who engage in character
friendships that are essentially moral educational in nature according to the
prevailing current understanding. Those are people of (a) equal social status
who are either (a1) equal in virtue or (a2) unequal in virtue; and (b) people of
unequal social status who are unequal in virtue. Notably, Aristotle presupposes
that inequality of social status implies inequality in virtue although equality
of social status does not guarantee virtue equality. This is obviously a highly
contentious assumption (as I have discussed elsewhere23), but because I want to
avoid scratching where it does not itch, I grant it here for the sake of argument.
Consider, for (a), two undergraduates who become friends as freshmen and help
each other grow in virtue, either (a1) because, being equal in virtue at the outset,
they share experiences on parallel tracks; or (a2) because the one who is more
virtuous at the beginning helps the other catch up while also developing herself.
For (b), consider a professor and a student who both grow morally from their
mutual interactions but where the more virtuous professor has more to give
in terms of moral knowledge, yet more to take back in terms of gratitude and
admiration. I return to those friendship dyads in the following two sections,
respectively.
Notice that in order to honor the intrinsic value of (character) friendship and of
loving the friend for her own sake, the friendship relation must not be entered into
instrumentally, with the explicit aim of incrementally enhancing one’s character
through interacting with, and thereby learning from, the friend. However, again,
this poses no serious threat to the thesis of moral education as the raison d’être of
character friendship. Consider as an analogue Millian utilitarianism, according to
which happiness is the sole intrinsic value. This does not mean that one’s life
is best led in direct pursuit of happiness where one asks oneself at every turn
what will be most pleasing here and now. What Millians tend to recommend,
rather, is engaging in worthwhile activities and then enjoying happiness as it
supervenes upon those activities. Similarly here, one chooses friends and enjoys
their company without asking oneself what they can contribute to one’s character
development. Yet the ultimate point of the institution of character friendships
is mutual self-cultivation of virtue. This also explains why people will hardly
ever offer the educational raison d’être as the explicit motivation for initiating
or engaging in friendship. Education acts here as a self-effacing “regulative ideal,”
an implicit guiding background condition of our motivation to pursue character
friendship, rather than as a direct source of motivation, just as in the case of
the utilitarian who is best advised to forget the raison d’être of his ethical
theory (except when engaging in a philosophical debate about it) in order not to
instrumentalize it.24
23. Kristjánsson, “Ten Un-Aristotelian Reasons for the Instability of Aristotelian Character Friend-
ships.”
24. Dean Cocking and Justin Oakley, “Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of
Alienation,” Ethics 106, no. 1 (1995): 88–91.
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The whole tenor of Aristotle’s discussion of all types of friendship is that
they are developmentally constituted and, in their most complete form as char-
acter friendship, educationally executed. There is no such thing as friendship
per se, but rather friendship exists at a certain developmental niveau (or level),
with its specific developmental assets and liabilities. Friendship is thus quali-
tatively differentiated according to its educational affordances qua resources or
barriers. Aristotle’s exploration bespeaks sensitivity to the liabilities and bar-
riers in the case of the lower types of virtues, but he brushes most of those
cavalierly aside in the case of character friendships. Yet, greater sensitivity to
what may imperil character friendships will add ammunition to the thesis about
their essential educational nature: namely, if it can be shown that what typi-
cally thwarts these friendships is, precisely, the exhaustion of their educational
potential.
Aristotle claims that character friendship is stable and enduring, once estab-
lished, as long as the friends do not live too far apart for too long (NE, 213
[1156b17–19], 223 [1159b3–4], and 238 [1164a12–13]). The only exception to this
rule that is discussed in any detail is if the friend becomes “incurably vicious.”
That the friend regresses morally, by degrees, is not a valid reason for the ter-
mination of the friendship unless the friend’s virtuous character has disappeared
completely or is beyond repair: “If someone can be set right, we should try harder
to rescue his character than his property” (NE, 244 [1165b15–35]). Aristotle does
not tell us explicitly why the friend’s characterological shift into incurable vice
warrants the termination of friendship. Yet, seen from the perspective of deep
friendship as an educational concept, two reasons immediately suggest themselves.
First, I risk debasing myself rather than growing morally from continued interac-
tions with the incurably bad. Such interactions would represent “an objectionable
sort of moral complacency” about my own development toward full phronesis and
would constitute a risky slope to slide down.25 Second, from the point of view
of the vicious friend, she also cannot gain anything from the friendship in terms
of education because complete vice precludes self-knowledge, which in turn pre-
cludes self-love; and as lack of self-love prevents her from loving others in the philia
sense (NE, 246–247 [1166b1–25]), the very foundations of any edifying character
friendship have been shattered.
I have pointed out elsewhere that Aristotle may be setting the bar too high,
however, and that if the two friends stop pursuing similar virtues in similar
enough contexts, it is likely that the mutual interest in each other’s destiny will
gradually fade away long before one of them becomes incurably vicious.26 From
an educational perspective, this point can be bolstered by arguing that continuing
to pursue soulmateship with a person who is on a slow but steady trajectory
25. Jessica Isserow, “On Having Bad Persons as Friends,” Philosophical Studies 175, no. 12 (2018): 3101.
26. Kristjánsson, “Ten Un-Aristotelian Reasons for the Instability of Aristotelian Character Friend-
ships.”
Kristjánsson Learning from Friends and Terminating Friendships 139
toward moral decline may do irreparable damage to my own virtuous makeup. The
respect and commitment to the friend notwithstanding, we seem at least entitled
to modify Aristotle’s thesis to say that one has good reasons for stamping out
friendship with a friend who is on such an unstoppable trajectory, even long before
the friend has wound up in a state of complete wickedness.
Given the sensitivity of Aristotle’s naturalistic moral theory to empirical
evidence, it is in order, at this juncture, to say something about why deep friend-
ships do in fact end. Although current psychological research is not confined to
character friendships and does not preselect only those friends whom Aristotle
would count as budding phronimoi, something would be amiss with Aristotle’s
restrictive thesis about friendship dissolutions if it did not have a solid basis
in reality.
In a nutshell, empirical research elicits lots of facts that do not seem to tally
with Aristotelian theory. A common cause for the dissolution of best friendships
is that the friends simply grow apart as their interactions are no longer psycho-
logically or educationally rewarding. Moreover, best friendships do not either
continue as such or come to an end; there are other possibilities as well: they can
be “downgraded,” temporarily or permanently, and then upgraded again. Some
people seem to prefer settled, long-lasting deep friendships while others are more
comfortable with “serial friendships” that change as their life changes. Only about
50 percent of best friendships among adolescents remain stable over one school
year. About 84 percent of teenage girls report at least one complete dissolution or
a downgrade of a best friendship. In general, the trajectory of deep friendships is
much more fluid, more relative to personality styles and psycho-social preferences,
and more subject to the wear of time and subtle changes in external circumstances
than Aristotle’s discussion suggests.27
Admittedly, some of the empirical findings can be explained away as applying
only to a younger and more eclectic group of people than Aristotle had in mind as
his presumed readership of budding phronimoi. Others can be related to social cir-
cumstances of greater geographical mobility in the modern world than in ancient
Greece (although some of those changes should be offset by people’s current tech-
nological means to keep friendships going across geographical distances). All that
said, one cannot shake the impression that, given Aristotle’s own universalism
about human nature, many of these empirical findings would have been the same
if Aristotle had conducted rigorous social scientific research in ancient Athens.
One must conclude that he may perhaps have been blinded by the lights of his fiery
mission to promote (character) friendship as a moral virtue of enormous endurance,
vitality, and strength. Unfortunately, understanding its raison d’être as educational
comes with certain downsides that Aristotle conveniently ignores.
27. Compare with Anne Bowker, “Predicting Friendship Stability during Early Adolescence,” Journal of
Early Adolescence 23, no. 2 (2004): 85–112; Julie C. Bowker, “Examining Two Types of Best Friendship
Dissolution during Early Adolescence,” Journal of Early Adolescence 31, no. 5 (2011): 656–670; and
Healy, “‘We Are Not Friends Anymore’,” and “After Friendship.”
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How Socially Equal Friendships May Lose Their Educational Value
and Become Dissolved
Although Aristotle claims to be using his standard method of working
through difficulties and contradictions in received wisdoms in his account of
friendship,28 his focus on the frailties of friendships and their terminations is
almost entirely confined to the “incomplete” types (of pleasure and utility), imply-
ing that once having become elevated to the level of character friendship, the
relationship is immune to most internal and external threats. I cannot, therefore,
endorse Marina McCoy’s contention that “Aristotle exhibits a tremendous sensi-
tivity to human moral weakness in his account of friendship.”29 However, that
is not all bad news. Having explored his educational rationale of character friend-
ships, we can now use Aristotle’s defining characteristics to hoist him with his
own petard in terms of the potential causes of character-friendship termination
that he overlooks.
In a previous paper, I suggested ten different reasons, beyond those identi-
fied by Aristotle himself, for the dissolution of character friendships.30 I called
those reasons “un-Aristotelian” in the sense of not being invoked by Aristo-
tle, although many of them seem to be potentially compatible with his gen-
eral theory of friendship. By drawing on the thesis proposed in the two previous
sections about education as the raison d’être of deep (character) friendships, it
is now possible to probe many of those reasons in more detail. In the present
section, I explore some educational reasons for the dissolution of socially equal
character friendships (beyond the reason of incurable vice), and in the follow-
ing section, I scrutinize the demise of socially unequal character friendships in a
similar way.
Aristotle does admit, albeit briefly, that in addition to drastic departures from
the path of virtue, circumstances may intervene through which friends become
separated — including increased disparities in wealth (NE, 221 [1159a33–34]).
However, he remains reticent about the specific problems that can beset charac-
ter friendships between people of an equal social standing that exhibit inequal-
ities in virtue. I will focus here on divergent developmental paths among peo-
ple who begin as social and virtue equals but who become increasingly dis-
tanced from each other as one of the pair turns in a direction that may ulti-
mately induce the other friend to pull up the friendship drawbridge. I am not
thinking here of Aristotle’s example of perversion into vice, but of something
less radical.
28. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On Virtues and Vices, 365
[1235b14–16].
29. Marina Berzins McCoy, Wounded Heroes: Vulnerability as a Virtue in Ancient Greek Literature and
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 146.
30. Kristjánsson, “Ten Un-Aristotelian Reasons for the Instability of Aristotelian Character Friend-
ships.”
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Let me invoke as a case in point a perspicuous novel by the best-selling
author Meg Wolitzer, The Interestings.31 This work has all the ingredients of
a blockbuster novel, but it also contains unusually penetrating observations
regarding the complexities of relationships between friends, as their fortunes tilt
precipitously during the course of their life journeys. Depicting the trials and
tribulations of a group of six Americans who become friends during a teenage
summer camp in 1974, and most of whom harbor (varyingly realistic) artistic
aspirations, the book offers glimpses of lives that — to keep readers absorbed —
are more tempestuous than the lives ordinary people typically lead, but that are
not far-fetched enough for readers to cease identifying with them.
With various narrative detours and a troupe of protagonists too numerous to
explore here, the three most interesting characters, for present purposes, are Ethan
and Jules, as well as Jules’s best friend, Ash, whom she also met at the summer
camp and who ends up marrying Ethan. The dynamics of the Ethan–Ash–Jules
triad, where Jules tries to preserve her friendship with Ethan while avoiding making
her best friend Ash jealous, is juicy enough to merit a discussion of potential
eros–philia conflicts (which Aristotle, for one, surprisingly ignores). The more
relevant dimension here of the (ultimately) fraught and tenuous friendship between
Jules and Ethan is how Ethan’s life takes a developmental turn that strains the
friendship with Jules almost beyond the breaking point. To be sure, in the novel
the friendship does endure — for otherwise the author would have had to bring
the narrative to a premature end. However, it is easy to envisage an alternative
trajectory where what happens to Ethan would have sufficed to dissolve the
friendship completely by exhausting the friendship’s educational potential.
Notice first that both Jules and Ethan are kind and caring people, “brought
up in good habits,” in Aristotle’s sense. While neither are full phronimoi (Ethan
is, for example, badly lacking in the virtue of courage), both would fall securely
into the category of budding phronimoi. The very rationale of their friendship,
which nourishes and sustains it, is their unremitting care for each other and the
eagerness of each to help, advise, and strengthen the other for the other’s sake,
along with the desire of both to learn from the one another’s experiences. In this
sense, they are typical character friends, and there is not a whiff of charlatanism
about their soulmateship. However, while Jules has to give up her artistic dreams
for a modestly rewarding career as a therapist, Ethan becomes shockingly suc-
cessful as an artist, “gilded with specialness and privilege” (TI, 347). Because of
his strong moral self-identity, Ethan channels his riches into philanthropy and
other charitable causes, turning himself into what Aristotle called a megalopsy-
chos: one who, because of largesse-enabling external fortunes, can afford to be
magnificent and grandiose in giving and in assisting others, not only mundanely
generous.
31. Meg Wolitzer, The Interestings (London: Vintage, 2014). This work will be cited in the text as TI for
all subsequent references.
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Although being a megalopsychos is, by Aristotle’s lights, a mixed blessing
(because of the strain being a busy public benefactor places on one’s intellectual
resources32), the moral developmental path of the megalopsychos is ethically
more advanced than that of a (budding) phronimos and involves the possibility of
blessedness in life rather than simple flourishing. However, here is the moral of the
story: Jules becomes increasingly disengaged from Ethan because she can no longer
identify with him and learn from him — nor give him advice relevant to his new life
circumstances. The issue is not so much Ethan’s raised status in life or his wealth
per se — which by itself might just have subtly changed the character friendship
with Jules into one of social inequality (rather than equality) while still retaining
its characteristic ethical quality. The issue, rather, is that Ethan gradually grows
into a “thicker, finalized adult self” (TI, 4) that does not allow for mutual correction
and reinvention with Jules’s self because their capacity for moral action has taken
such different turns that the educational basis of their friendship becomes eroded.
Whenever Ash and Ethan “cooked a chicken, it would feed a subcontinent” (TI,
50); whereas Jules’s attempts at good deeds remain limited to offering her close
friends and her own ailing husband (a chronic depressive) some modest comfort.
She feels she wants to be “as good as” Ethan is (TI, 122), but because of lack of
personal and financial resources, she falls desperately short in this regard and that
discrepancy gradually creates a wall between the two of them.
The friendship between Ethan and Jules changes “into something so different
from what it had originally been as to be unrecognizable” (TI, 135). The imbal-
ance between them is “suddenly, jarringly evident” (TI, 236). The almost “tele-
pathic mutuality” between them is lost (TI, 171), not because Ethan becomes irre-
deemably bad but rather because his goodness achieves heights that Jules cannot
share with him as a soulmate. If they met now, “they would never become friends”
(TI, 241). The lesson is that lives can divide, and even the best of friendships can
become threatened, for a reason that is the diametrical opposite of the one that
Aristotle foregrounded. The possibility for mutual education and self-cultivation
in character friendships is parasitic on there being a shared area of experiences and
activities that can inform the sensibilities of both parties and help them to cor-
rect each other. If one person becomes “too good,” it can create a barrier that is
just as insurmountable as the one that results from the person becoming “too bad”
because, in either circumstance, the shared zone of proximal development that
serves as the relevant educational crucible disappears.
Another instructive example has been elicited by Alexander Nehamas from
the play Art by Yasmina Reza.33 Notably, Nehamas uses this example to illustrate
his theory about the grounding of deep friendships in the aesthetic qualities of
friends rather than, as in Aristotle’s theory, in their moral character. However, the
example can easily be reinterpreted in the service of a moralized-cum-educational
32. See Kristján Kristjánsson, Flourishing as the Aim of Education: A Neo-Aristotelian View (London:
Routledge, 2020), chap. 4.
33. Nehamas, On Friendship, 142–185.
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account of what actually grounds deep friendships. In the play, three friends (Marc,
Serge, and Yvan), who had previously shared a mutual appreciation of art, fall out
when Serge pays a fortune to buy a painting that the other two find aesthetically
worthless. Marc accuses Serge of pretentiousness, maintaining that he has bought
the painting simply because it is in vogue; Serge, in turn, takes Marc to have
become a paternalistic besserwisser. Nehamas sees this example as indicative
of the precariousness of best friendships insofar as they are based on essentially
fleeting phenomena, such as one’s taste in art. Lack of aesthetic harmony can thus
easily undermine friendships, as friendship is more about a common characteristic
“style” than a common moral “character.”
As an Aristotelian, I read the lesson of the story quite differently. If I were Marc,
what would worry me is not the sudden incompatibility between my aesthetic
tastes and those of Serge. I would rather see Serge’s gesture as indicative of a more
profound change of character profile: from authenticity to pretentiousness. While
such a transformation falls short of a debilitating descent into vice, I still would
worry that I had nothing more to learn from Serge and that we would no longer
be able to hone each other’s moral sensibilities. In other words, the educative
rationale of the friendship would be lost — and I do not mean educative as in
“aesthetic education,” but rather in the sense of “moral education.” While I say
this as a neo-Aristotelian, I repeat my discontent that Aristotle himself did not
consider nonextreme character shifts of this kind as offering valid reasons for the
discontinuation of deep friendships, and that he instead fastened only on more
radical and rare examples. That said, Marc may have been too quick in seeing
the change in Serge as a reason for terminating their friendship. When friends
change their values, we have the option of also changing our values accordingly
rather than rigidly sticking to our guns (as Amélie Rorty explores34). Still, even in
such cases, the decision is educational as much as psychological. We need to ask
ourselves about the additional educational resources such a change would create
in our trajectory toward self-cultivation, and also weigh the educational barriers
that it might potentially erect.
Because dissolutions of friendships on grounds of subtly changing developmen-
tal paths are probably much more common than Aristotle envisaged, and such dis-
solutions are often profoundly painful, one may have some sympathy with the UK
head teacher who discouraged pupils from forming “best friendships” so as to avoid
the pain and upset caused by fallings out.35 While, from an Aristotelian perspective,
this would count as an overreaction (throwing the baby out with the bathwater),
extensive research findings that highlight the long-term negative consequences of
34. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, “The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters
Not When It Alteration Finds,” in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 73–88.
35. Healy, “‘We Are Not Friends Anymore’,” 196, n. 1.
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(deep) friendship-endings for pupils’ sociomoral development and school success
provide grist for the head teacher’s mill.36
Jessica Isserow is quite right that on any plausible account of the grounding
of deep friendships, enhancing their credentials “is not something to be swiftly
achieved by cutting ties with those friends who are deemed morally subpar, and
replacing them with the good Samaritans and humanitarians of the world.”37
In that sense, Aristotle was on target about the unique endurance of character
friendships. However, once the friendship has become perverted from its educa-
tional purpose, this may legitimately lubricate the slide toward the friendship’s
dissolution (or at least its downgrading to a mere pleasure or utility friendship)
long before the friend has turned incurably bad.
How Socially Unequal Friendships May Lose Their Educational Value
and Become Dissolved
The thesis about education as the raison d’être of deep friendships has, I
submit, even more initial plausibility in the case of unequal friendships, such
as between a teacher or professor and a student. World literature teems with
examples of young learners soaking up wisdom and reflective virtues from mentors
while the mentors rejuvenate their own character with inputs from the youthful
exuberance and open-mindedness of their mentees. However, Aristotle makes
things slightly difficult for himself with three limiting conditions he places upon
unequal character friendships. Two of those I have briefly touched upon before:
first, that such friendships are, by necessity, doubly unequal, with inequality
in social standing implying inequality in virtue; second, that the mentee is not
allowed to initiate the friendship with the explicit aim of learning from the mentor,
to avoid the risk of instrumentalization. Instead, the mentee has to be motivated
to love the mentor for the mentor’s own sake (and vice versa). The third condition
is slightly odd. It takes the form of an equalizing principle, according to which
unequal friendships only work if the stronger party is “loved more than he loves;
for when the loving reflects the comparative worth of friends, equality is achieved
in a way” (NE, 221 [1158b26–29]). So while the weaker party gets “more profit” (in
terms of character growth), the stronger party gets more honor and devotion (NE,
236–237 [1163b1–15]). I call this principle “odd” because Aristotle later makes the
empirical claim that “benefactors seem to love their beneficiaries more than the
beneficiaries love them [in return],” just like the craftsman “likes his own product
more than it would like him if it acquired a soul” (NE, 250–251 [1167b16–35]).
Thus, the equalizing principle itself seems to fall afoul of minimal psychological
realism, which is not good news for the strict ethical naturalist, Aristotle.
These three limiting conditions notwithstanding, Aristotle seems to be sur-
prisingly oblivious to the various obstacles that may stunt and decimate unequal
friendships as “schools of virtue.” To avoid unnecessary controversy, let me focus
36. Ibid., 187.
37. Isserow, “On Having Bad Persons as Friends,” 3107.
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in the remainder of this section on unequal friendships of the kind that are
most explicitly educational, in order not to beg the question whether all are.
I am thinking here of friendships between teachers/professors qua mentors and
their mentees. Two penetrating studies provide examples of those. Amy Shuffel-
ton recounts the friendship that she, as a teacher, developed with an artistically
inclined, nerdy, and lonely elementary school pupil in Krakow some time ago —
a friendship that has persisted over many years, with the former pupil being a
young man in his late twenties when the article was written.38 Paul Weithman
elaborates on “academic friendships” between professors and the undergraduate
students in their classes.39 Weithman refrains from defining those as full-blown
character friendships in the Aristotelian sense, as they normally disband at the end
of the academic year; instead, he relies rather obliquely on references in Aristotle
to a higher form of utility friendships that “would seem to depend on character”
more than one sees in ordinary “mercenary-type” utility friendships (NE, 233–234
[1162b23–27]). However, Weithman fails to account for cases where the student
continues to rely on the mentorship of the professor long after graduation and
where their friendship even lasts as long as both live, as is not infrequently the case
in my own experience. It would be churlish to deny such associations the status of
unequal but complete character friendships in the Aristotelian sense. Another way
to put this point is to say that the “terminating conditions” of friendships between
professors and (graduated) students are not as clear-cut as those, say, between a
doctor and (cured) patients.40
Shuffelton spends considerable time discussing the objection that friendships
of this kind breach the teacher’s duty of impartiality toward all her students. She
correctly argues that a teacher can give all her students excellent service while
giving some of them (who, for some reason, need personal friendship rather than
just instruction) more of it. In some cases of particularly vulnerable students,
the truly caring teacher will rush in unhesitatingly where others are unwilling to
tread. In my previous article on character-friendship problems mostly overlooked
by Aristotle, I identified specific barriers that unequal mentor–student friendships
may encounter.41 For one thing, because such friendships tend to be motivated
by concerns that involve enjoyment by the mentor in spending time with a
young person, as well as considerable academic benefits accruing to the mentee
from the association with the more learned person, there is serious danger of
the friendship never reaching the higher level of character friendship or, worse
38. Amy B. Shuffelton, “Philia and Pedagogy ‘Side by Side’: The Perils and Promise of Teacher–Student
Friendships,” Ethics and Education 7, no. 3 (2012): 211–223.
39. Paul Weithman, “Academic Friendship,” in The Aims of Higher Education: Problems of Morality
and Justice, ed. Harry Brighouse and Michael McPherson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015),
52–73.
40. Cocking and Oakley, “Indirect Consequentialism,” 94.
41. Kristjánsson, “Ten Un-Aristotelian Reasons for the Instability of Aristotelian Character Friend-
ships.”
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still, of degenerating gradually into mere pleasure or utility friendship even if
it does actualize the higher ideal at the outset. For another thing, because of
the well-known phenomenon of role inertia — a phenomenon that is routinely
scrutinized in social psychology — it is highly likely that even after the mentee
has caught up with the mentor in terms of character development, their association
continues to be stuck in the terms in which it was originally forged. In such cases,
a potentially equal character friendship becomes misconceived by one or both
parties as unequal, thus undercutting its capacity to (continue to) be educationally
productive. As Aristotle himself acknowledges, one of the biggest dangers to a
friendship is if the two friends do not conceive of the friendship as belonging to
the same type: of complete versus incomplete (NE, 243 [1165b5–11]).
As already noted, Aristotle is reticent about possible eros–philia conflicts
that often lurk around the corner in these cases, as in other kinds of character
friendships.42 It is not so much that he excludes cross-gender friendships (for
example, he explicitly states that a husband and his wife can enjoy “friendship
for virtue, if they are decent. For each has a proper virtue, and this will be
a source of enjoyment for them” [NE, 232 (1162a25–27)]). It is rather that he
does not share modernity’s concerns with the faint undercurrent of excitement
often floating close to the surface in friendships between the genders and how
this undercurrent may gradually plunge any budding character friendship into a
maelstrom of misunderstandings, jealousies, and conflicts. While modern scholars
have studied this problem in detail,43 none of them has focused specifically on the
detrimental effects of eros–philia conflicts on the educational “regulative ideal”
of character friendships.
I will end this section, therefore, with a brief discussion of a problem that is
more explicitly educational and to which, I submit, unequal character friendships
of the kind I have been considering are particularly susceptible. Let us call it
the problem of paternalism. Since the Enlightenment, the ideal of education as
the cultivation of the critically reflective, autonomous individual has permeated
almost all respectable educational theories in the Western world, in one guise or
another. Any educational interventions smacking of paternalism are anathema
to the ideal of autonomy. Obviously, the ideal of autonomy was not familiar
to Aristotle in its modern form. However, he famously demanded that virtuous
persons not only perform the right actions, but also perform them for the right
reasons and from the right motives: knowing them, taking intrinsic pleasure in
them, and deciding on them for themselves (NE, 40 (1105a30–34)]. The underlying
assumption is that ethical acts do not have moral value unless they are guided by
the agent’s own phronesis; and although phronesis-guidance cannot be equated
42. Shuffelton, “Philia and Pedagogy ‘Side by Side’,” 220.
43. See, for example, Kathy Werking, We’re Just Good Friends: Women and Men in Nonromantic
Relationships (New York: Guilford Press, 1997); and John R. Scudder and Anne H. Bishop, Beyond
Friendship and Eros: Unrecognized Relationships between Men and Women (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2001).
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with autonomy in the modern sense, it is incompatible with the idea of a moral
agent being paternalistically controlled by an external puppet master.
Despite the high-brow ideals to which both Aristotelian educators and —
more radically still — their modern counterparts are meant to aspire according
to the phronesis and autonomy mantras, every seasoned educator knows that no
educational activities can get off the ground without some measure of paternal-
ism involved. In a sense, all students beginning the study of a new topic subject
themselves to initiation into certain qualities of mind, hitherto unknown to them,
by putting themselves under the teacher’s authority and guidance. As Weithman
unapologetically puts it, the professor should try to make her partnership with
students formative; it is her job to form their intellectual tastes.44 However
strongly the ideal of autonomy figures as the eventual goal, and however much the
learning process is conceptualized as subjection to normativity itself rather than
subjection to the teacher’s authority as a guide to that normativity, there is no
escaping the fact that the pedagogical relationship involves, by its very nature, ele-
ments of paternalism — even if that paternalism is self-chosen and fully complied
with by the student. This fact forces upon the teacher, whether she wants it or not,
certain motivational and dispositional structures45 that seem to be quite alien to a
relationship between character friends, even of the unequal kind. For example, it is
incumbent on the teacher to impart certain knowledge, a particular mindset, and
specific skills, and the measure of whether or not that has been successful seems
to have very little to do with the mutual collaborative self-cultivation of character
that is meant to be the raison d’être of Aristotelian character friendships.
What I have been saying here is not that the role of a teacher/professor is essen-
tially incompatible with the role of an unequal character friend as Aristotle under-
stands that role. There are, I believe, countless examples of mentor–mentee friend-
ships where those two roles have been brought into alignment. I am simply calling
attention to a warning signal that failed to register on Aristotle’s radar. Although
character friendships with a socially superior party are often entered into precisely
to avoid the paternalism that typically characterizes unequal associations, there is
great danger that friendship with a teacher or professor is liable to become, to be
perverted into, the very vice that it was created to resist. It is not so much that
friendship with a student undermines the teacher’s paternalistic authority,46 but
the other way round: that the teacher’s authority can undermine the friendship.
Concluding Remarks
The aim of this article has been to retrieve (deep) friendship as an educational
concept. While the most obvious place to pan for gold is Aristotle’s account of
character friendship, whose value is essentially moral-educational, I have focused
44. Weithman, “Academic Friendship.”
45. Compare with Cocking and Oakley, “Indirect Consequentialism,” 93.
46. Scott Jarvie, “‘O My Friends, There Is No Friend,’: Friendship and Risking Relational (Im)Possibilities
in the Classroom,” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies 41, no. 2 (2019): 115–138.
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here more on the negative side of the story: how viewing friendship as an educa-
tional concept helps make sense of why many deep friendships are so vulnerable
to dissipation and rupture. In a nutshell, putting an educational construction on
friendship comes with as many liabilities as assets, and those may in some cases
not only enfeeble the specific friendship in question but fully cancel its advantage.
To be sure, one of the glories of Aristotle’s moral and educational theory is its
focus on the value of friendship; at the same time, however, one cannot but wish
that his assessment of its pros and cons had been more measured and evenhanded.
I will end this article with two observations. The first is that the some-
what rose-tinted view of character friendships as one-sidedly rewarding “schools
of virtue” that one finds in Aristotle may be but one more instantiation of his
general overestimation of the characterological stability of people brought up in
good habits. The idea of the (increasingly) unified moral agent on an (unproblem-
atically) upwardly mobile trajectory toward full phronesis, with the help of trusted
friends on the same journey, belies the extent to which human life is rarely a qui-
escent stretch, characterized by psycho-moral integration, but rather is one that
bends with the winds of time and fortune — and where dilemmas lurk around every
corner, including dilemmas about how to best interact with one’s friends. Because
we are constantly changing as persons, it is no wonder that, as we enter new unfore-
seen situations, the educational benefits that we derive from associations with
different friends fluctuate and may, in some cases, make us drift apart from people
who, at previous junctures, were our “other selves.” The very point of education
is to enact change, and it would be remarkable if the change that my friend enacts
in me, or vice versa, always kept us close together rather than prying us apart.
In many cases, drifting away from one another will be a slow process, just as the
effects of education rarely hit us in an epiphanic instant. In the words of Samuel
Johnson, the “most fatal disease of friendship is gradual decay, our dislike hourly
increased by causes too slender for complaint, and too numerous for removal.”47
The second observation is that education is not, by its nature, an essentially
comfortable process. Socrates did not only liken himself to a midwife but also
to a gadfly and a torpedo fish. Our desire for self-verification is often stronger
than our desire for self-cultivation, and even when moral educational guidance
is provided by a character friend nonpaternalistically, it may touch a raw nerve.
In the words of novelist Patrick White, friendship is “two knives.” “They will
sharpen each other when rubbed together, but often one of them will slip and slice
off a thumb.”48 There are times when we are simply not ready to have our thumb
sliced off and where guidance from our friends is seen — rightly or wrongly — as
being surplus to requirements.
47. Samuel Johnson, quoted in Josie Barnard, The Book of Friendship (London: Virago, 2011), 228.
48. Patrick White, quoted in Mark Vernon, The Meaning of Friendship (London: Palgrave-Macmillan,
2010), 74.
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“Friendship is something that won’t be boxed. It wriggles.”49 Aristotle did his
best to “box” friendship conceptually into different types and he advanced the
discourse considerably by doing so. However, when attempting to box character
friendship as the complete type and to put an educational spin on it, he tried
to control and contain a phenomenon that, like all education, has an inherent
tendency to wriggle and get out of hand. It is not so much that Aristotle was wrong
about the educational value of deep friendships; indeed, I think his insights were
fundamentally right. It is rather that he underestimated the extent to which even
potentially educationally beneficial friendships are fraught with risk and remain,
for various reasons, liable to conflicts and disruptions.
49. Barnard, The Book of Friendship, 55.
